FROM TRANSACTIONS TO STRUCTURES
Although gifts, entitlements, and compensation are the primary categories of payments, all three types also vary internally. Gifts, for example, differ in quality as functions of the relative equality between parties to the transaction and the intimacy of the relationship. Even when their gifts are monetary, intimate equals offer each other gifts very differently than distant unequals do. Note the unmistakable contrasts among proper forms for tips, tributes, bribes, allowances, and anniversary presents-all gifts of a sort, but quite distinct in form, meaning, and implied social relation. Where the relation is unclear, contested, or liable to misinterpretation, Zelizer points out, parties commonly adopt dramatic earmarking devices such as wrapping gift money witll the same care one might lavish on a personalized object or making sure that banknotes offered as prizes are new, crisp, and uniform.
Larger differences separate gifts, entitlements, and ~ompensation. Although discretion and enforcement may seem incompatible, gift transfers generally rely on the enforcement of obligations that spring from shared commitment to some joint enterprise. Two elements-unspecified future rewards from that enterprise, and immediate satisfaction of solidarity and gratitude-combine to provide incentives for giving. Failure to offer expected gifts therefore signals weakened commitment to the enterprise, an especially damaging sign when the relationship has been intimate and relatively equal. Failure to give when expected also threatens unequal relationships: an inferior's reluctance to offer appropriate gifts signals rebellion, while a superior's neglect signals that the subordinate has declined in favor.
Entitlements stand out from gifts and compensation in relying less on the payer's discretion and the recipient's current performance. Like gifts and compensation, however, entitlements have distinctly different qualities depending on the relevant contract's breadth and equality; a veteran's pension, for example, contrasts sharply with a divorced spouse's payments for child support. Here conceptions of justice and appeals to third-party enforcement figure much more importantly than in the case of gifts. Recipients of entitlements typically use whatever leverage they enjoy with third parties to limit evasion and discretion on the part of payers. Judges, priests, parents, and senior family members all sometimes intervene to enforce entitlements.
Compensation might seem more impervious to variation as a function of social relations, regulated as it often is by bargaining and narrow as market relations can be. Even compensation, however, varies significantly in form depending on the social relations involved. Within the same corporation, compare the compensation packages received by the CEO and the night security guard; they differ iIl content-daily perquisites, long-term benefits, ownership rights, periodicity of payment, and more-as much as they differ in amount. Or note the enormous difference in form between a one-time settlement with a street vendor and the elaborate monetary exchanges for goods and services inside a family.
Indeed, major legal, domestic, and political struggles formed in the United States over the very question of whetller payments from husbands to wives constituted entitlements, gifts, or compensation (Zelizer 1994a). Each position had significantly different implications for the quality of relations between spouses: did the money a woman received from her male companion constitute her rightlUl share of collective resources, a discretionary gift from a man to a woman, or payment to the woman for her domestic and sexual services? Similarly, donors and recipients of charitable payments have struggled incessantly over the form and status of their monetary transfers: in cash or in earmarked credit, with or without the monitoring of expenditures, and so on. They have implicitly contested whether charitable tI'ansfers qualified as entitlements (e.g., family allowances), compensation (e.g., rewards for efforts at self-improvement), or gifts (e.g., the benefaction of a compassionate patron). Precisely because the form~) of monetary transfers marked them as gifts, entitlements, or compensation, such transfers characterized the relationships between parties to the transactions. Participants who disagreed over the character of their relationships therefore also fought over the forms.
Similar distinctions and disputes appear in the very heart of market life, within capitalist firms themselves. Forms of payment for work differ systematically as a function of relations among workers as well as between workers and their bosses. Payment in stock options, bonuses, elegant surroundings, wide-ranging perquisites, and ample retirement packages signals a different relation to the bosses and the firm than does straight hourly payment in a weekly check.
Although employees certainly strive to increaSE~ their total revenues from the firm that employs them, a surprising share of competition and collective struggle concerns not quantities but fom1S of payment, hence qualities of social relations within the workplace. 'The centuries-old arrangement whereby coal-hewers received pay according to amount of coal delivered rather than time or effort expendecl signaled their position as quasi-independent contractors within their mines; miners' long resistance to standardized time payment revealed their awareness of the change in social relations the new arrangement implied.
Zelizer's analysis nicely illustrates differences between essence and bond accounts of social behavior. Although economists have for a century promoted a picture of monetary payments aE: solitary acts temporarily connecting individual buyers to impersoJ:lal markets, Zelizer shows us that payments are rooted in rich social matrices, their forms and significance varying greatly with the social relations at hand, their modalities .< and not just their amounts) objects of heartfelt struggle among the parties. Even when it comes to pecuniary exchanges, we live in a relational world.
Many other human activities that first appear to be quite individual later turn out to have a strong relational compont~nt. Consider essence and bond accounts of feeding. This book began l)y discussing stature and differential nutrition by category. One can, of course, construct essentialist accounts of the matter, focusing on the experiences of individual metabolizing organisms. The superb work of Fogel and associates certainly depends on clear understanding of how individual bodies acquire, accumulate, and expend energy. Yet feeding, the crucial social process, is doubly relational: diets and manners of feeding vary systematically from one social category to the next, marking the boundaries between them. They also depend on relations among members of distinct categories.
Marjorie DeVault's analysis of how American w.omen feed other people in their households, including the men, brings out that relational aspect of nutrition dramatically. DeVault reminds us that, despite rising female employment outside the home, feeding f.unilies remains overwhelmingly women's work. All right. Yesterday I we thought our girls were coming out the night before and I had bought some artichokes for the~ so I cooked them anyway. So I scooped out the center and made a tuna salad and put it in the center I on lettucel tomatoes arclund. And the~ I had made zucchini bread. ..So that was our lundi. H I had to do it every day I would find it difficult.
. Why not? He doesn't he wouldn't like it, woul,ln't appreciate it. Or peanut butter and jellYI for instancel it's not enough of a lunch to give him. (DeVault 1991, 147-148) Whatever else a "really decent meal" meant to this woman and her husband, she clearly wanted her food preparation to signify that she understood her proper relationship to him. Commensalism relates people, but it also depends on strongly structured relations among them. Those FROM TRANSiACTIONS TO STRUCTURES relations are often categorical: parent / child, wife / husband, servant / master, boarder / landlord, and so on.
BUILDING BLOCKS
Categorical inequality represents a special case of categorical relations in general. It is a particular but spectacularly potent combination within a small set of network configurations that have reappeared millions of times at different scales, in different settings, throug;hout human history. Although network analysts have studied some of these configurations repeatedly (see Wasserman and Faust 1994,17-20) , no one has codified our knowledge of how they connect and operate. Provisional nominees for the basic set include the chain, the hierarchy, the triad, the organization, and the categorical pair:
A chain consists of two or more similar and connected ties between social sites (persons, groups, identities, I1letworks, or something else). A hierarchy is a sort of chain in which the connE~ctions are asymmetrical and the sites systematically unequal. A triad consists of three sites having ties to eac1l. other that are similar in content, although not necessarily similar in valence.
An organization is a well-bounded set of ties in which at least one site has the right to establish ties across the botmdary that can then bind sites connected by internal ties. A categorical pair consists of a socially SignifiCaIlt boundary and at least one tie between sites on either side of it.
(We might actually reduce the basic set to three, since a hierarchy is simply a special type of chain and, as we shall see, an organization is an overgrown categorical pair. For our purposes, however, it helps to distinguish all five.) Figure 1 schematizes the five elementary forms. I regard these network configurations as social inventions, perhaps developed incrementally by trial and error, no doubt reinvented independently many times, but, when recognized, more or less deliberately instantaneous distributions of vehicles on a stretch of superhighway: coherent, exhibiting recurrent regularities, but not entities in themselves since their structure derives entirely from the actions and interactions of individual drivers.
If Barth's view is correct, my elementary forms could be recurrently emergent outcomes of more elementary social relations. Triads, for example, could emerge simply because stable pairs tend to recruit third parties jointly. Hierarchies could, in principle, simply generalize patterns of asymmetrical interaction. If methodological individualists could specify and validate rules for single-actor decision-making that constitute sufficient conditions for the creation of chains, hierarchies, triads, organizations, and paired categories, they would make strong claims for their favored reductionism. Fortunately, it matters little for purposes of this discussion whether we are dealing with inventions or emergents; once they are in place, people employ them for a wide variety of relational work.
Configurations multiply beyond their elementaT}' forms: chains proliferate into long chains, two-step hierarchies into ten-step hierarchies, triads into dense networks of interconnection, categorical pairs into triplets, and so on. People who work in civil service, for example, become familiar not just with the relation between their own rank and adjacent ranks but also with a whole ladder consisting of asymmetrical connections.
Configurations also compound with each other; many hierarchies, as we shall discover later, incorporate categorical pairs, for instance, when physicians are Caucasian males and the nurses wh.o work for them are Filipinas. An imaginary social structure compouncling such configurations appears in Figure 2 , which connects hierarchies ABD and ABF, triads BDF and BEF, chain DFG, and categorical pair CD. Also, through command position A, the diagram relates the entire organization (the bounded network) to external site X. In this imaginary case, site A enjoys the right to establish binding contracts between the whole and outside actors.
Whether or not these five network configurations turn out to be the elementary particles of social life, they recur very l.videly, doing characteristically different forms of social work. Their recurrence poses a triple~ FROM TRANSACTIONS TO STRUCTURES 51 a much wider range of opportunities, on average, than do strong ones. Although subsequent research has shown that medium-weak ties, with their modicum of commitment, provide better-quality information than very weak ties, the broad distinction between the effects of strong and weak ties has held up well to empirical scrutiny (Erickson 1996; see also Anderson 1974; Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert 1986; Campbell and Rosenfeld 1986; Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980; De Schweinitz 1932; Holzer 1987; Laumann 1973; Lin 1982; Lin and Durnin 1986; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988; Montgomery 1994; Murray, Rankin, and Magill 1981; Simon and Warner 1992) . Weak ties occupy important places in all sorts of large-scale coordination. Without weak ties, for example, most people would acquire very little information about current politics, medical innovations, or investment opportunities. Second, each configuration has its own causal regularities that demand individual attention. In triads, for example, where B and C have a distinctive relation (e.g., they are close friends), stability seems to require that relations AB and AC be similar (e.g., subordination, rivalry, or friendship rather than subordination in one case and friendship in the other). If two relations (AB and AC) are similar, solidary, and symmetrical, furthermore, the third (BC) tends to assume the same form. No doubt such properties help to account for the significance of triads in social structures that promote trust in the face of uncertainty and risk. Behind these apparent regularities lie both mutual learning and responses to the heightened transaction costs of inconsistency.
Third, we must investigate conditions for concatenation of the elementary structures: which ones fit together effectively under what circumstances, whether the presence of one sort of structure promotes the formation of the other, how many of a given kind an organization can contain without starting to collapse. As evidence concerning diminishing returns from large spans of control suggests, for example, very extensive hierarchies seem to negate their coordination advantages by incurring greater transaction costs and to invite subversion, shirking, or rebellion as well. No doubt other structural constraints limit the number of categorical pairs any organization of a given size can maintain, the relations among categories of varying sizes, and the types of viable combinations of categorical pairs with hierarchies (Blau 19m. Categorical boundaries that require the parties on either side of the . mutually avoid each other except for ritualized encounters, would most likely, .. sive hierarchies.
Such a description of configurations, to be sure, freezes them sculptures when in real life they more closely resemble the;---patterns seen in a waterfall. The description summarizes various dencies that we observers might notice in fast-moving 1---among social sites. In fact, the ties in question shift among' ' tions, as when actors ii1 a chain invoke or abolish a ( '.
."-tion among themselves (friendly neighbors, for example, I'
.'
suddenly react to racial barriers that lie between them) or when bers of a hierarchy temporarily behave as a ( , , sergeant, and private, for example, defend each other against J essarily take the fonn "Insofar as ties among sites fonn triads " duce durable inequality. Designed, prescribed, and inherited will. People make incessant mistakes; interactions produce pated consequences; and, in many circumstances, if everyone followed the ostensible rules, either organizational disaster or an standstill would result. A master cabinetmaker once arrived to install a set of handsome bookcases he had built in his shop. shelves and hardware, his helper brought in a large sack. I looked in theI: sack and saw several score small, thin wooden wedges. The conversa-l tion continued: 1 "What are those?" "Shims." "What for?" "Well, it's clear you're not a cabinetmaker. We use shims because there's no suCh thing as a straight wall or a straight piece of wood. Shims straighten up the connections. Otherwise there'd be gaps all up and down the backs of the bookcases, and they might fall off the wall."
In human interaction, people constantly avert disasters and standstills by inserting social shims in the form of self-corrections, reassurances, clarifications, compensatory actions, and mutual aid. Social processes are worse than bookcases, however: because they keep moving, no social shim stays in place very long. Social structures stick together, more or less, precisely because improvisation never ceases.
SCRIPTING
AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE Figure 3 captures some of the variability involved. It represents two dimensions along which social transactions differ: the degree of localized common knowledge that participants in a transaction deploy, and the extent of scripting for such a transaction that is already available jointly to the participants. In principle, transactions include events in which one actor changes the state of another actor; the term "transaction costs" describes the energy expended in such interchanges. In practice, we concentrate on distinguishable interactions during which at least one actor exhibits a response to the other. Scripts range from the routines involved in such general configurations as triads and paired categories to the specific formulas people adopt to withdraw money from a bank. Just as pianists recognize and perform not only standard scales but also the intricate figures of a Beethoven sonata, interacting humans engage in routines that range from the virtually universal to those activated by only one social situation. Similarly, local knowledge extends, for example, from tacit understandings acquired by long-term residents concerning connections among different locations in a city to the memory of previous conversations that frames today's lunch between two old friends. Scripts provide models for participation in particular classes of social relations, while shared local knowledge provides a means of giving variable content to those social relations. Among the four basic mechanisms that generate durable inequality, emulation relies chiefly on scripting, while adaptation relies heavily on accumulation of local knowledge. Actually, however, all four mechanisms-exploitation, opportunity hoarding, state authorities becomes more likely as management's' ling unruly subordinates. Yet over and above such important marking certain positions, e.g., or install different categorical pairs (white/black, different locations within its perimeter.
CATEGORICAL PAIRS AND THE MECHANISMS OF INEQUALITY
ber of organizational forms that work effectively in a veryof situations. One form is hierarchy, another the network built relatively homogeneous triads, a third the long-stranded fourth ity. Yet another is the location of paired, unequal categories at a defined boundary.
bumblers. But almost all human beings learn to detect, join, transfer, and even create these forms early in life. predictable yet often unforeseen consequences: unanticipated but tions and vice versa; concentration of intimacy, marriage, and relations of trust within triad-dominated networks; exclusion I fled but unconnected persons from categorically concentrated: and so on. Categorical inequality results from the institution of a eral, powerful, problem-solving organizational form, the cally related categorical pair, in a rewards and/ or punishments. Categorical inequality production of collective goods. It is pernicious, however, to the Opportunity hoarding operates more effectively and at lower in conjunction with categorical inequality. Emulation and adaptation strengthen \ equality. For any given organization, ' -tunity hoarding lowers the cost of maintaining categorical inequality. In a given population, the more prevalent and / or powerful ; ganization installing a given pair of unequal categories, the mOre widespread the overall inequalities in welfare between members of the two categories will become across that population.
Categorically differentiated experience in a given setting pro- Exploitation occurs when one section of the population prod~ces ia surplus whose use is controlled by another section. Classes in M~~t theory exist only in relation to each other and that relation tums upon the form of exploitation occurring in a given mode of production. It is exploitation which gives rise to class conflict. Thus different types of society, the classes within them, and the class conflict which provides the dynamic of any society can all be characterized by the specific way in which exploitation occurs. (Bottomore 1983,157) Without employing the full apparatus of Marxist theory, my analysis of exploitation draws directly on that idea of sectionally organized inequality. Note the relational content of the Marxist view: a boundary coexists with well-defined unequal relations across that boundary; the boundary and the unequal relations reinforce each other. Although neoclassical economic doctrine declares that workers generally receive the equivalent of their labor's marginal product, exclusion from full value added marks the general condition of labor under capitalism. The labor theory of value grew up within eighteenth-and nineteenth-century crafts as a hierarchy of masters, journeymen, and apprentices with significant possibilities of movement upward gave way to an almost unbridgeable gap between capitalists and workers; organized capitalists excluded workers from full value added, and workers cast that exclusion in the labor theory of value. During the nineteenth century, strict wage labor displaced the arrangements of indenture, apprenticeship, slavery, and household incorporation under which most subordinate workers had previously labored (Steinfeld 1991; Tomlins HOW CATEGORIES WORK By convention, although all households were domiciled in villages, cattle were tended at distant posts, beasts hunted in the wild, and agriculture conducted at fields to which producers moved for the annual arable cycle. But the regulation of seasonal movement and its associated activities was a prerogative of the ruler. This was the crux of the tension, for its exercise was in the material disinterest of the population at large. Yet it was deeply inscribed in the logic of royal power, being an essential aspect of the processes through which the center dominated the domestic periphery and appropriated its surpluses. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 107) Further sharp divisions appeared within the subject population. Tshidi villages combined agriculture, pastoralism, hunting, and gathering. As is often the case, women did almost all agricultural work and thereby supplied the great bulk of the population's subsistence. But prestigious ritual and exchange activities depended on cattle raising, a male domain in which young boys, poor dependents, and serfs did the routine work. "Female cultivation (and, to a lesser extent, gathering)," remark Comaroff and Comaroff, "actually subsidized male activity in the public domain, establishing a material base on which rested the transactions of agnatic politics" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 107). Additional categorical systems separated generations, kin groups, and ethnically defined populations. Although Tshidi males hunted intermittently, "those who hunted on a regular basis, Sarwa ('bushmen') serfs, were seen as semi-human creatures; they were allowed into the town only at night to deliver skins, meat, and honey to their masters" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 108) . In each case, categorical distinctions did the work of exploitation, enlisting the effort of persons who received less than the value added by their contributions.
In all such circumstances, categorical inequality does not one but two(kind of work for the powerful. It facilitates the extraction of effort from , .without fully sharing the returns of that effort.
also permits members of the superior category, which is usually smaller, to distribute solidarity-generating benefits within their number, thus ensuring a command structure and orderly sucwithin an elite. Mancur Olson once denigrated such "distribucoalitions" as barriers to collective efficiency except when they approached coalitions of the whole, but he recognized their coalition members (Olson 1982) .
. I have so far described exploitation as if erholders organized it free of cost. ~t initial world twice. First, every organization~ innovation invention, perfection, installation, socialization, and adjacent elements; most involve ,
of constraining ties outside the organization, and facilitatio&: tance. Second, because no one can entirely control the actions r every innovation generates bargaining among organization, we can label as "struggle" or "contention' -of bargaining. Bargaining incorporates local knowledge and standard scripts. Even in Caribbean slave economies, ;' cpmbe points out, slaveowners varied greatly in the -, they exercised over their ltuman chattel; they more often for example, within .-to day. Some slaves therefore lived in "near freedom.." gues persuasively that the central deterrnm~t ofgea~ent "near ~edom" slaves was~e~laveo~er's w~ting ~e slave to be)
Thus it Was that when the slaveowner wanted s~aves thathebr she treated them as if they"'; rights, and in the extreme gave them rights.
Despite Stinchcombe's language of intention and ( practices sprang not only from slaveowners' organiZational but also from incremental, iJnplicjt, , tween masters and wprkers. Any full dude the costs of implementation as equal-among the principals..
As the examples of citize~hip,Tshidi social divisip~, indicate, exploitation operates over a broader range than labor processes in any strict sense of the word. It occurs wherever well-connected people control valuable resources from which they extract returns by deploying the effort of others, whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort. The "value" in question may of course be monetary, but it may also take the form of power, deference, perquisites, services, goods, or protections. Categorically organized exploitation plays a part in almost all processes that generate durable inequality.
OPPORTUNITY HOARDING
A second general mechanism promoting categorical inequality, the hoarding of opportunities by the nonelite, complements exploitation. When members of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a resource that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network's modus operandi, network members regularly hoard their access to the resource, creating beliefs and practices that sustain their control. As in exploitation, a boundary separates beneficiaries from others, while unequal relations across the boundary connect them. In opportunity hoarding, however, beneficiaries do not enlist the efforts of outsiders but instead exclude them from access to the relevant resources. Immigrant niches provide strong examples of this second inequality-promoting mechanism. So, however, do trade diasporas, cults, professions, criminal conspiracies, and homogeneously recruited elite military units. These last examples point to an important variant on this second type of mechanism. Initially heterogeneous cults, priesthoods, criminal conspiracies, and elite military units sometimes create exclusive inequalitysustaining categories in the process of exploiting such valuable resources; and they often enhance commitment to these categories by means of intense socialization and segregation for entering cohorts. Savor the following reflections on the treatment of plebes (first-year military cadets) by a career officer who graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point and later taught there for years:
West Point breeds restraint deep into a man's soul.
---tell ruin to stand straighter, or to recite. pline," or to lead his squad mates in a rousing cheer-I ---enty-flfth maxim demands .. at a time until he gets them right-or -netted rifle, and he will rip the sawdust-filled dummy to shreds. sual observer, on the sidelines of these military:
' -cadet is no less human than he, and probably --, war. He understands the merits of restraiilt as well force. (Hoy 1996, 64, 66) Pat Hoy's readers might join me in wondering whether today threats to human life come £rom"random acts of violence" fessionals trained to kill dispassionately, but they will recognize upperclass treatment of plebes at .
process at work. : of the process that creates unequal categories, not to mention gorica1ly segregated recruitment into the elect. This ing benefits from survival into membership. Consider a more benign version of the same arrangements. savings and credit associations-Chit in India, Hui in Taiwan, in Senegal, Kye in Korea (Besley 1995, -their membership to carefully screened ries. Because the association's members maintain dense, adic, relations with one another, monitoring costs fall, the costs of exclusion to defaulting members rise. Trade I which a handshake with a person of common origin seals a dollar transaction-for example, different specialties within the diamond business, most of which belong to particular ethnic networks-operate on similar principles (Curtin 1984; Greif 1989) .
In a situation of fierce competition for scarce resources, such a mechanism often comes to involve both exclusion and exploitation. Opportunity hoarding turns into exploitation. All it takes is investment of pooled savings and credit in activities that profit disproportionately from the efforts of excluded persons. When members of excluded categories organize to resist-as when South African Zulus attack Asian merchants or New York blacks boycott Korean-owned groceries-they commonly complain that just such a synthesis of exclusion and exploitation is hurting them. .
An extreme, often malign, variant of the pattern exists. A threatened elite sometimes tries to create racial divisions, to redefine racial boundaries, or to racialize boundaries that already exist as a way of reducing an insubordinate population's power. Later we shall see how just such a process worked in South Africa after 1903. But the United States also experienced multiple versions of the process after Emancipation. Given the fact that many people had mixed African and European ancestry, the South's Jim Crow legislation typically not only legislated separate and unequal positions, for "black" and "white" citizens but also defined anyone having any known African ancestors as black. Hence great advantages accrued to mixed-race families who could "pass" for white, great anxieties about purity of blood, strenuous efforts at constructing genealogy in support of white claims to superiority.
A similar, often equally pernicious, process unfolds at national and international scales in the creation of ostensible nations whose spokespersons claim priority within the native territory. Where rewards such as statehood, military aid, or preferential access to land accrue to leaders who assert credibly that they represent unified, distinct, and worthy ,populations, political entrepreneurs have powerful incentives to create, fortify, and enforce exclusive inequality-sustaining categories while suppressing alternative categorizations and denigrating populations that lie across their category-defining boundaries.
Although most such assertions fail, for the past two centuries several hundred of them have succeeded internationally, bringing recognition~ of sovereignty to putative nations that previously lacked political omy and sovereignty-linked rights to arm, tax, coerce, monitor, clude. They acquired independent states. Once, ~ .' such as the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) provided the World War II, great powers have generally delegated to the United tions the job of certifying successful categorical performances by of recognition as an independent state. , Those reCurrent processes have built durable categorical' into the international system. Because the stakes are so high, more, members of competing categories within the same polity often killed each other over such demands. Ũ nion and Yugoslavia after' frequency of genocide and politicide have increased world as a whole since World War II, others from us benefits have risen (Gurr 1994; Gurr and Harff 1994) .
These wide-ranging examples establish that a correlation, I . equation, exists between elite position and exploitation, 1 -elite position and opportunity hoarding. Elites typically i and maintain (' engaging the effort of less-favored others in generating returns tification of niches not already fully exploited by elites. tunity hoarders thrive in the form of professionals who of rich individuals who bequeath wealth to their children, and in form of powerful persons who enjoy private hunting lodges, . mafiosi, pimps, and sweatshop operators. " the distinction exploitation/ opportunity hoarding with the elite / nonelite. at least implicitly, on a counterfactual hypothesis: with i of organization-and especially without a categorical division of and reward-people could still produce at least as well as the existing division of labor allows, and a less unequal division of rewards would occur. Although extreme cases such as slavery make hypotheses of this sort plausible, over a wide range of unequal social life they are harder to specify and verify. We must face the counterfactual challenge in the usual ways: empirically by placing observed social arrangements in comparative perspective (what alternative ways of organizing similar activities can we find elsewhere in history, and what governs their relative effectiveness?), theoretically by breaking down complex processes into their elements and showing that in principle those elements can combine differently (using nothing but causal mechanisms and sequences known to have worked elsewhere, can we identify different paths away from the same initial conditions?). Although nowhere will I stage a grand confrontation between theory and evidence, pages to come will repeatedly feature empirical and theoretical discussions along these counterfactuallines.
EMULATION
By extension, the two main mechanisms favoring categorical inequality activate the third mechanism, which I have called emulation, the reproduction of organizational models already operating elsewhere. Emulation works throughout the social world and includes the adoption of egalitarian models of social interaction as well as models applying across a wide range of social relations, from equal to unequal: compounds of chains, triads, organizations, and categorical sets that mayor may not articulate with hierarchies. Here we concentrate on the special version of emulation I have called borrowing, the transfer of chunks of social structure that happen to include unequal categories. Almost all military organizations install distinctions between officers and enlisted personnel, between those whom the organization entrusts with comttland or responsibility for its major resources and all others; most of them then assimilate such professionals as physicians, engineers, and thaplains to the officer corps. The dividing line between caballeros (horsemen who owned their own equipment and often brought their own retainers) and peons (footsoldiers who came to ---w ith little but their own labor power) emerged from Castilian chains, hierarchies, triads, and whole organizations , categorical sets. Duplication of major organizational segments or whole organizations, including unequal categorical relations, F location to another transfers the effects of accumulated i" -their familiarity makes them seem natural in the new setting. Emulated organizational forms are sometimes unique zation copied, as when refugees from, emulation follows general models, including categorical that encompass any particular ': duce the ethnic, racial, and gender divisions of labor that are already familiar to their employees from earlier work in other hotels; new universities reproduce the departments, administrative divisions, and hierarchies of payment prevalent in the old universities from which their founders came.
ADAPTATION
A fourth complementary mechanism, adaptation, keeps systems of categorical inequality in place despite playing little part in their creation. Adaptation, like emulation, is an extremely general social mechanism that figures widely outside the realm of inequality. It has two main components: the invention of procedures that ease day-to-day interaction, and the elaboration of valued social relations around existing divisions. In the absence of concerted resistance by members of subordinate categories and exogenous changes in the host organization, all parties build multiple routines around the categorical boundary and thus acquire interests in its maintenance; they alter scripts and accumulate satisfying local knowledge. Assuming the continuity of existing divisions, however much they resent those divisions, office workers elaborate time schedules, evasive practices, mythologies, jokes, epithets, alliances, and conspiracies that actually reinforce the structures within which they grow.
On-the-job sexual harassment and predation by male workers against female co-workers sometimes serve exploitation and opportunity hoarding, as when male artisans drive female competitors off the job. Most of the time, however, it occurs as an adaptation that gives male misogynists additional incentives to maintain the gender boundary without giving female victims the capacity to overturn the practice. Marian Swerdlow's vivid report of her experiences and observations during four years as a rapid-transit conductor affirms that in the absence of a work-based interior boundary corresponding to the gender line, even sexist men eventually tend to recognize the competence of women in the same jobs and to check their harassment as they do so (Swerdlow current practices and relations. Once coherent sets of stories, relations, and practices about a given kind of categorical inequality are available, people unthinkingly integrate them into their daily routines and solve organizational problems with them.
When the activities in which people are involved benefit from drawing lines between the included and the excluded, having unequal categories already at hand-whatever the categories-advances those activities handily. Thus shared beliefs play significant parts in the operation of categorical inequality and limit the organizational alternatives that participants consider, fear, or desire. But if the transaction costs of a given system of inequality rise dramatically or the likely benefits of an alternative system increase visibly, shifts in categorical relations occur much more rapidly than any explanation resting on belief alone can account for. The agility of nationalists in shifting from one definition of who they are (and of their relations to others who are not so blessed) to a different definition illustrates the organizational opportunism that regularly moves inequality-sustaining beliefs. So does the quickness with which bosses and workers alter their theories about the inherent talents and deficits of different categories of workers when shifts in labor supply force an alteration in recruitment to particular sets of jobs.
INEQUALITY
AT WORK How can we apply this analysis to the all-important world of work, where so much durable inequality begins and ends? Let us consider work to be any human effort that produces transferable use value. Although plenty of work goes on outside jobs and firms in any strong senses of the two words, let us speak temporarily of jobs and firms. (A job is a bundle of work contracts-rights and obligations governing the relations among producers and recipients of transferable use valueattached to a single person; a firm is any organization whose internal positions consist chiefly of jobs.) Even within well-developed capitalist firms and labor markets, we find the causal nexus of categorically organized exploitation, occupy jobs linked to their skilled elders by both shared work contracts and prospects for mobility. To the extent that machinists receive distinctive rewards, that recruitment to a position as an apprentice machinist engages categorically segregated supply or recruitment networks, and that a job as a skilled machinist requires promotion from apprentice, categorical inequality separates machinists from other workers in the firm. My earlier distinction between turnover pools and command-andpromotion pools, with their very different packages of rewards, illustrates the same principle. Such large differences typically generate interior categories with well-marked boundaries governing not only forms of payment but also mobility chances, dress, demeanor, sociability, and belief.
Firms also rank jobs and categories of jobs with respect to each sort of reward they offer, with different kinds of rewards commonly correlating with each other but not defining identical rank orders. Some jobs give more money, others more autonomy, and so on. We must distinguish ranking from sorting, the matching of individuals with jobs. Ranking processes determine how much inequality in rewards appears within a firm, but sorting processes determine to what extent those inequalities coincide with exterior categorical boundaries.
Some sorting certainly corresponds to individual attributes and performances: educational record, demonstrated zeal, acquired familiarity with local procedures, and more. Within the large pools of short-term employees who work in fast-food restaurants, enterprising managers keep their eyes open for workers whose energy, poise, linguistic skills, and sense of responsibility mark them as potential recruits to management. Some self-selection also takes place, as people who enjoy command head for careers in law enforcement rather than social service or human rights advocacy (Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, and van Laar 1996) . But a large (if still debatable) share of all sorting matches jobs not with individual attributes or performances but with whole categories of people. Why match interior categories such as turnover pools to exterior categories such as gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, or social class? The reasons range from the self-conscious to the inadvertent. At the self-conscious end of the scale, people who build or changẽ .~ ---~ much more--directly into organizational structure. Such adopted devices often include importation of categories from gender-typing, ethnic typing, and so on.
At the scale's inadvertent end, however, lie an ( . of organizational processes that match exterior to interior Here members solve... .-tunities by drawing on categorically segregated networks. ., trust, train, and help each other more fully when they share the contacts of workers already on the job; subcontracting lines of managers' previous collaborations; and the cruitment of people ;' , gories into the organization's daily life. Here opportunity emulation, and adaptation intersect to reinforce exploitation. Let me put it more generally. Seen from the perspective of an labor force, categorical inequality in the rewards of work breaks into the effects of eight general factors:
Categorical differences in job qualifications, which may ,-suit from discrimination in households, neighborhoods, other settings or from unequal distribution across such settings Employer discrimination by category within equivalent jobs Categorical differences in potential workers' preferences for 1--jobs Bounding of jobs within firms Ranking of jobs within firms Linking of jobs within firms, which concerns not only -r --peds but also access to collaboration, patronage, and on-the-job training Categorical designation of jobs Categorical segregation of recruitment and supply networks by job and/ or firm In the form of human-capital, discrimination, and queuing theories, standard models of inequality feature the first three factors: categorical differences in job qualifications, employer discrimination, and categorical differences in preferences. These are the factors that lend themselves easily to individualistic interpretations. For all their prominence in the descriptive literature on work and labor markets, the remaining, heavily relational factors-bounding, ranking, linking, categorical designation of jobs, and categorical segregation of networks-have received little theoretical attention.
A ninth, even less visible, factor also helps produce categorical inequality: differential distribution of category members among firms and nonfirm worksites, including sites outside the labor force as customarily defined. To the degree that categories differ in their distribution between sweatshops and other kinds of factories, between formal and informal economy, between work in firms and work at home, those differences contribute to categorical inequality in the rewards of work. Categorical inequality by age makes the strength of such effects clear: people under the age of fifteen or over the age of seventy do plenty of useful work, but they do little of it for wages in jobs, firms, or labor markets; very old and very young workers get much less money per unit of effort than those of other ages. The same sort of unequal distribution across sites of work occurs by gender, race, and national origin.
Without denying the presence of categorical human-capital differences, employer discrimination by category, and categorical variation in job preferences, I claim that organizational processes of the sort I have been describing playa large part in the production, maintenance, and change of categorical inequality. Human-capital differences form largely as indirect effects of categorically segregated experiences in other settings. Employer discrimination operates largely through the installation of organizational boundaries rather than person-by-person differentiation. Workers' preferences conform significantly to built-in boundaries. Even state intervention in the nine inequality-generating factors typically rests on categorical assumptions concerning capacities and propensities for different kinds of work.
Two implications follow: first, that preferences and wage bargains provide too thin a base for explanations of durable inequality at work; and, second, r self-conscious discrimination but from efforts to solve other, , tional problems by the incorporation, often unintentional, of I. categories into the structure of work and labor markets. Our job, Exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, ; ate at each node in the processes that allocate differential members of ' distribution of category members over firms, industrit::;, w ork statuses; bounding, ranking, linking, tion of jobs; the categorical i works; hiring, promotion, and transfer among work positions.
,~ -~ ~_._!.
separate two questions that analysts of inequality ordinarily daily operations? Why and how do such i corporate certain widely established exterior categories: gender, ethnicity, educational background? To answer those questions, we must think about the actual t ion of firms. Imagine two network X-rays of all the jobs in a first short-term, the other long-term. -day-to-day relations of : for frequent interaction. features some long chains, most of them hierarchical, and many containing multiple triads. The triadic clumps include' cupying relatively equal positions within the firm than
The long-term X-ray, f sistence of persons in the same positions from job to job-promotions, demotions, and ings, layoffs, retirements, the short-term X-ray into long chains (mostly hierarchical) and clumps of relatively equal jobs.
The two X-rays resemble each other. The rplays many more lines, since it registers both the relations fault lines and solidarities categorically, tions on either side of the boundary, and the relations The labels show up in annual reports, letterheads, and charts, but they also emerge in an organization's informal names for mafias, cabals, connections, cliques, categories both distinguish and relate sets of interconnected who have shared stakes in the organization's performance. gory has a partly independent incentive system. Figure 5 schematizes the broadest level of refines the earlier command/turnover distinction among job differentiating three types of work contracts (the prescribed between a given worker and other parties to his or her work). typically bundle work contracts into jobs, the firm-enforced" obligations defining the relations of a i we see jobs differing significantly with respect tion (an eventual share in the firm's profits rates low degree to which supervisors prescribe, monitor, and correct the who receives hourly pay for regards.
systems. Task incentive systems emphasize block payments i services delivered to the firm, as when a company engages a physician to conduct medical examinations of prospective for so much per examination or when a telephone sales agent at home for straight commission; contingent compensation the firm's disposition for closely notype around the turn of the twentieth century, substituting hourly pay for payment by the job, sponsoring trade schools that would teac? printing outside the shop, challenging craft control over the pace of production, and undermining printers' unions when they could (Baron 1991b,64-65 Drive systems rely on extensive scripting with little local : task systems on little scripting with extensive local knowledge, systems on significant shares of both scripting and shared r edge. Loyalty systems correlate with intemallabor markets, within the firm if they perform well, have considerable accumulating firm-specific knowledge, client chains that informally I '
Firms commonly reward workers in loyalty systems by giving i higher pay, more secure tenure, better benefits and perquisites, long-term accumulations of rights and equity. j . workers generally produced under task systems; even within . foremen commonly received lump sums for quantities produced, -nization of labor processes. As early twentieth-century facturers brought craft workers under tighter central control, those whose jobs they could not deskill and drive they;' off with integration into loyalty systems.
Loyalty systems frequently appear in conjunction with' ' ternallabor markets, strong incentives for energetic performance. According to ministrator at Indsco, Kanter, "Money' pany to cut its losses by ensuring that people do their job at i reward we really control is the ability to promote" (Kanter i993, A given firm may, of course, maintain two or --, gated loyalty systems. A chemical company, for, among them for promotion into executive ranks. .' company might create quite a different mobility track for laboratory technicians who will never have a chance to become executives. A firm may also create multiple clusters of task incentiv~ or drive incentive jobs, each with its own categorical label; every large hospital, for instance, incorporates several such distinct clusters in food preparation, cleaning, laundry, patient care, and elsewhere. Kanter compares two well-segregated systems within Indsco:
The great divide in company personnel terms was the exempt/nonexempt distinction. "Nonexempts" were the workers paid weekly and covered by wage-and-hour laws; for example, they must be paid overtime rates for extra hours. In the office and administration side of the company, nonexempts were almost all women, although there were a few nonexempt men at both low and high status, such as mail messengers on the low end or accounting clerks on ladders leading to exempt jobs. "Exempts" were on annual salary; they were the managers, the professionals, and the sales and technical workers, who were still practically all men. (Kanter 1993, 37) Drive incentives figured more prominently for nonexempts, loyalty incentives for exempts. Mixes of task, loyalty, and drive incentive systems vary drastically from firm to firm and industry to industry, with task work rare or nonexistent in fast-food establishments but predominant , filmmaking, and commercial art. Television writing, for typically operates by the job:
The employment relation for television writers is closer to the kind of short-term contracting typical of craft administration of production than to the bureaucratically organized intemallabor market typical of large -, -, e " .
weeks to a few years, but even among the and Bielby 1995, 212) drive and loyalty components enter the television writer's . categorical relation X > Y, the relation X +-~ Y becomes a basis of inequality over the entire population. ' gories matter greatly, as powerful sets of actors establish relationships across readily recognized boundaries. But where categorical differences prevail, their indirect effects also ( tematic on-the-average differences in performance.
systems. Thus the spiral of categorical inequality spins on.
